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Abstract—This paper analyzes regularization terms proposed recently for improving the adversarial robustness of deep neural
networks (DNNs), from a theoretical point of view. Specifically, we study possible connections between several effective methods,
including input-gradient regularization, Jacobian regularization, curvature regularization, and a cross-Lipschitz functional. We
investigate them on DNNs with general rectified linear activations, which constitute one of the most prevalent families of models for
image classification and a host of other machine learning applications. We shed light on essential ingredients of these regularizations
and re-interpret their functionality. Through the lens of our study, more principled and efficient regularizations can possibly be invented
in the near future.
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1 INTRODUCTION
I T has been discovered that deep neural networks (DNNs)are vulnerable to adversarial examples [1], [2], [3], and
the phenomenon can prohibit them from being deployed in
security-sensitive applications. Amongst the most effective
methods for mitigating the issue, adversarial training [1], [2],
[3] is capable of resisting a series of malicious examples [3],
[4] and yield adversarially robust DNN models in the sense
of an lp norm. By injecting advanced adversarial examples
(e.g., using BIM [5] or PGD [3]) into training as some sort of
augmentation, the obtained models learn to defend against
these examples. In addition, the obtained models may also
resist some other types of adversarial examples (generated
using, for example, the fast gradient sign method [2]). How-
ever, advanced adversarial examples are typically generated
in an iterative manner by back-propagating deep models
for multiple times, and thus the mechanism may demand a
massive amount of computation [6].
Another thriving category of methods for hardening
DNNs is to perform regularizations, aim at trading off the
effectiveness and efficiency properly. Although most tradi-
tional regularization-based strategies (e.g., weight decay [7]
and dropout [8]) do not operate properly in this respect, a
variety of recent work [6], [9], [10], [11], [12] has shown that
more dedicated and principled regularizations help to gain
comparable or only slightly worse performance in improv-
ing DNN robustness. Instead of raising a perpetual “arms-
race”, these regularization-based strategies are in general
attack-agnostic and of benefit to the generalization ability [9]
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and interpretability of learning models [11]. Moreover, the
computational and memory complexity of these methods
are acceptable in very large models. It has also been shown
that the methods can be combined with adversarial training
to achieve even stronger DNN robustness.
While many regularizers have been developed for DNN
robustness, there is of yet few comparative analysis among
these choices, especially from a theoretical point of view. In
this paper, we attempt to shed light on intrinsic functionality
and theoretical connections between several effective regu-
larizers, even if their formulations may stem from different
rationales. Concretely, it has been presented over the past
few years that regularizing the Euclidean norm of an input-
gradient [11], [13], the Frobenius norm of a Jacobian ma-
trix [12], [14], the spectral norm of a Hessian matrix [6], and
a cross-Lipschitz functional [10] all significantly contribute
to the adversarial robustness of DNNs. We analyze all these
choices on DNNs with general rectified linear activations,
which are ubiquitous in image classification and a host of
other machine learning tasks.
Some of our key contributions and observations are:
• We present, for the first time, an analytic expression for
the l2 norm of an approximately-optimal adversarial
perturbation concerned in very recent papers [6], [15],
to demonstrate that local cross-Lipschitz constants [10]
and the prediction probability are its essential ingredi-
ents in binary classification cases. In addition to the l2
norm-based results, we also show similar results for the
robustness to l∞ norm-based attacks.
• We unveil that most discussed regularizations advocate
small local cross-Lipschitz constants in binary classifica-
tion, except for the Jacobian regularization that suggests
small local Lipschitz constants, yet regularizing the two
network properties can be equivalent.
• We further demonstrate that critical discrepancies still
exist between specific methods, mostly in regularizing
the prediction probability/confidence.
• We extend some analyses to multi-class classification
and verify our findings with experiments.
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2.1 Adversarial Phenomenon in DNNs
Given an input instance x ∈ Rn, a DNN-based classifier
offers its prediction along with a softmax normalized prob-
ability p(x)k = exp(zk)/
∑
exp(zj) for each class k on top
of a vector representation z = g(x). Suppose that a set of
labeled instances {(xi, yi)}i are provided, then a classifier is
typically learned with the assistance of an objective function
L(·, ·) that evaluates training prediction loss, i.e., the aver-
age discrepancy between a set of predictions {p(xi)}i and
ground-truth {yi}i.
Existing adversarial attacks can be roughly divided into
two main categories, i.e., white-box attacks [1], [2] and
black-box attacks [16], [17], according to how much informa-
tion of the victim model is accessible to an adversary [18].
Our study in this paper mainly focuses on the white-box
non-targeted attacks and defenses against them, in order to
be complied with prior theoretical work. Under such threat,
substantial endeavors have been exerted to demonstrate the
adversarial vulnerability of DNNs [1], [2], [3], [18], [19], [20],
[21], [22]. Most of them are proposed within a framework
that favors perturbations with least lp norms yet would still
cause the DNNs to make incorrect predictions. That being
said, an adversary opts to solve
min
r
‖r‖p s.t. argmax
k
g(x+ r)k 6= argmax
k
g(x)k. (1)
Utilizing the objective function L(·, ·), the task of mounting
adversarial attacks can be formulated from a dual perspec-
tive which attempts to maximize the loss with a presumed
perturbation magnitude (in the context of lp norms). That
being said, given  > 0, one may resort to
max
‖r‖p≤
L(x+ r, y). (2)
Omit box constraints on the image domain, many off-the-
shelf attacks [2], [3], [18], [19], [20] can be considered as
efficient approximations to either (1) or (2). Under certain
circumstances, their solutions can be equivalent to the opti-
mal solutions to (1) or (2). For instance, the fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) [2] achieves the optimum of (2) with some
binary linear classifiers and p =∞ [23]. Also, take any linear
model together with p = 2, the DeepFool perturbation [20]
is theoretically optimal to (1). Training with an augmented
set involving adversarial examples, i.e., adversarial training,
has been proven to be very effective in improving the DNN
robustness [3], regardless of the computational burden.
2.2 Regularizations and Important Notations
A recent study [15] demonstrates the relationship between a
classical regularization [24] and adversarial training [2]. It is
conceivable that a principled regularization term involved
in training suffices to yield DNN models with comparable
robustness, whereby a whole series of methods have been
developed. Unlike many traditional methods which are nor-
mally date-independent (e.g., weight decay and dropout),
recent progress conforms closely with theoretical guarantees
and focuses mostly on regularizing the loss landscape [6],
[10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. Before systematically studying their
functionality and relationships in the following sections, we
first introduce some important notations.
Given the objective function L(·, ·) for classification, we
will refer to 1) ∇ := ∇xL(x, y), as its gradient with respect
to (w.r.t.) the input vector x, 2) H , as the Hessian matrix of
L, and 3) J , as the Jacobian matrix of g(x) w.r.t. x. It has
been presented that training regularized using ‖J‖F—the
Frobenius norm of J (dubbed the Jacobian regularization, [12],
[14]), ‖∇‖2—the Euclidean norm of∇ (i.e., the input-gradient
regularization, [11], [13]), ‖H‖2—the spectral norm of H
(i.e., the curvature regularization, [6]), and a cross-Lipschitz
functional [10] as will be elaborated later all significantly
improve the adversarial robustness of obtained models. We
focus on DNNs with general rectified linear units (general
ReLUs) [25], [26], [27] as nonlinear activations and analyze
in binary classification and multi-class classification tasks
separately in the following sections.
3 BINARY CLASSIFICATION
With the background information introduced in the previ-
ous section, here we first discuss different regularizations in
binary classification DNNs, and we will generalize some of
our results to multi-class classifications in Section 4.
For simplicity of notations, let us first consider a multi-
layer perceptron (MLP) parameterized by a series of weight
matrices W1 ∈ Rn0×n1 , . . . ,Wd ∈ Rnd−1×nd , where n0 = n
and nd = 2 in our theories. (We stress that, although a simple
MLP is formulated here, our following discussions directly gener-
alize to DNNs with convolutions, poolings, skip-connections [28],
self-attentions [29], etc.) For a d-layer MLP, we have
g(x) =WTd σ(W
T
d−1σ(. . . σ(W
T
1 x))), (3)
in which the general ReLU activation σ(·) of our particular
interest is piecewise linear and hence g(·) is also piecewise
linear. Following prior work [23], we can define a0 := x
and aj := σ(WTj aj−1) = D
T
j (x)W
T
j aj−1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ d, in
which
Dj(x) := diag
(
1Wj [:,1]T aj−1>0, . . . , 1Wj [:,nj ]T aj−1>0
)
(4)
is an nj × nj diagonal matrix whose main diagonal en-
tries corresponding to nonzero activations within the j-th
parameterized layer take an value of +1, and others take
an value of 0. Denote by w± the two columns of matrix
Wd (i.e., Wd = [w+,w−]), we have the two entries of p(x)
as: p(x)+ = exp(wT+ad−1)/
∑
exp(wT±ad−1) and p(x)− =
1 − p(x)+. These two scalars estimate the probability of
x being sampled from the positive and negative classes,
respectively. Since g(·) is piecewise linear as analyzed, there
exists a polytopeQ(x) to which the input instance x belongs
and on which g(·) is linear, i.e., Dj(x′) = Dj(x) and
g(x′)|x′∈Q(x) = V Tx′, (5)
in which V = [v+,v−] is a matrix with its columns v± :=
W1D1(x) . . .Wd−1Dd−1(x)w±.
3.1 Robustness in Binary Classification
Our analyses stem from Problem (1). For binary classifica-
tion with y ∈ {+1,−1}, we can rewrite the optimization
problem as: minr ‖r‖p s.t. L(x + r, y) ≥ β, just as sug-
gested [6], in which β is a threshold for correct and incorrect
classifications and its value solely depends on the choice
3Fig. 1: Illustration of how ‖r∗‖2 varies with the prediction
probability p(x)y in binary scenarios.
of the loss function L(·, ·) (e.g., if the cross-entropy loss is
chosen, then β = log(2)). It follows from DeepFool and
others [6] that we may well-approximate the constraint with
a Taylor series and get bounds for the (l2) magnitude of
r∗ := argmin ‖r‖2 s.t. L(x, y)+∇T r+ rTHr/2 ≥ β, as will
be presented in Lemma 3.1 as below.
Lemma 3.1. [6] Let x be a correctly classified instance such
that ξ := β − L(x, y) ≥ 0, and let u ∈ Rn be the normalized
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of H , then we
have
‖∇‖2
‖H‖2
(√
1 +
2‖H‖2ξ
‖∇‖22
− 1
)
≤ ‖r∗‖2 ≤
|∇Tu|
‖H‖2
(√
1 +
2‖H‖2ξ
|∇Tu|2 − 1
)
.
(6)
The above lemma establishes connections between the
robustness of a DNN and the spectral norm of its Hessian
matrix H . Though enlightening, the variables u, ‖∇‖2, and
‖H‖2 in Eq. (6) are heavily entangled so that it is difficult to
reveal the functionality of concerned regularizations.
Fortunately, we show that the derived bounds are tight
such that they collapse to the same expression in terms of
p(x)y and a local cross-Lipschitz constant [10] in binary
classification with some common choices of the loss function
(e.g., the cross-entropy loss and logistic loss). To be concrete,
suppose that the cross-entropy loss is adopted, then with the
n × 2 matrix V = [v+,v−] introduced in Eq. (5), we have
the following lemma and theorem.
Lemma 3.2. (Simplified expressions for J ,∇, and H). Given
an instance paired with its label (x, y), we have for the Jacobian
J , input-gradient ∇, and Hessian H :
J = V,
∇ = y(p(x)y − 1)(v+ − v−)T ,
H = p(x)+p(x)−(v+ − v−)(v+ − v−)T
= p(x)y(1− p(x)y)(v+ − v−)(v+ − v−)T .
(7)
Proposition 3.1. (An analytic expression for ‖r∗‖2). For the
binary classifier with a locally linear g(·) and a correctly classified
instance x, we have
‖r∗‖2 = 1
p(x)y‖v+ − v−‖2
(√
1 +
2p(x)yξ
1− p(x)y − 1
)
. (8)
Proposition 3.1 is obtained on the basis of Lemma 3.1
and 3.2. See our proofs in Appendix A and B, respectively.
Similar results can be achieved with the logistic loss (as also
demonstrated in the appendix). The decomposition of ‖r∗‖2
(i.e., the l2 magnitude of r∗) in the derived Eq. (8) appears
to be more obvious than in Eq. (6), and it can be concluded
that ξ, p(x)y , and ‖v+−v−‖2 jointly affect the l2 magnitude
of r∗. Seeing that the value of ξ is determinate w.r.t. p(x)y , the
prediction probability p(x)y and ‖v+ − v−‖2 become the only
dominating ingredients. Let us define ν := ‖v+−v−‖2 which
is in fact a local cross-Lipschitz constant of g(·) [10] for
better clarity. Even though ν might as well be influential to
the prediction probability p(x)y , we discuss them separately
here, considering that the latter can still be optimized with
any presumed value of the former 1.
It is easy to verify that ‖r∗‖2 = 0 holds for all ν > 0,
in a special case of p(x)y → 0.5+. Yet, for p(x)y > 0.5, the
general impact of the prediction probability p(x)y in Eq. (8)
is still obscure. To gain direct insights, we depict how ‖r∗‖2
varies with p(x)y ∈ (0.5, 1.0] on the right panel of Figure 1,
given specific ν values. We observe that, in general, a larger
p(x)y implies a larger ‖r∗‖2 and thus lower vulnerability of
a classification model, provided that the l2 magnitude of r∗
is a reasonable measure of the robustness and p(x)y > (1−
p(x)y) (or equivalently, p(x)y > 0.5). See also the left panel
of the figure for an illustration with p(x)y approaching 0.5
from above, being equal to 0.7, and being equal to 0.9.
Our theoretical result in Proposition 3.1 gives rise to a
formal guarantee of the l2 robustness for piecewise linear
DNNs, without concerning much about the accuracy of the
Taylor approximation. Regarding the adversarial robustness
to some other lp norm-based attacks, we have similar results
in this paper. One might be of special interest to the p = ∞
case as it has been widely considered in practical attacks.
Proposition 3.3 and 3.2 provide results from different view-
points in correspondence to (2) and (1), i.e., by bounding the
worst-case loss η∗ := max‖r‖∞≤ L(x, y) +∇T r + rTHr/2
with any fixed  > 0 and by providing an analytic expres-
sion for the l∞ norm of r˜∗ := argmin ‖r‖∞ s.t. L(x, y) +
∇T r+ rTHr/2 ≥ β. 2
Proposition 3.2. (An analytic expression for ‖r˜∗‖∞). For the
binary classifier with a locally linear g(·) and a correctly classified
instance x, we have
‖r˜∗‖∞ = 1
p(x)y‖v+ − v−‖1
(√
1 +
2p(x)yξ
1− p(x)y − 1
)
. (9)
Proposition 3.3. (An upper bound of η∗). For the binary
classifier with a locally linear g(·) and a correctly classified input
instance x, we have ∀r ∈ Rn satisfying ‖r‖∞ ≤ , it holds that
η∗ = L(x, y) + (1− p(x)y)‖v+ − v−‖1
+
1
2
2p(x)y(1− p(x)y)‖v+ − v−‖21.
(10)
3.2 Regularizations in Binary Classification
Besides Proposition 3.1, some intriguing corollaries can also
be derived from Lemma 3.2. First, the direction of the input-
gradient vector ∇ is the same as that of the first eigenvector
(i.e., the one corresponding to the largest eigenvalue) of
matrix H . Second, we can derive ‖∇‖2 = (1− p(x)y)ν and
‖H‖F = ‖H‖2 = p(x)y(1− p(x)y)ν2, which means that we
1. Within linear networks where all instances share the same (data-
independent) v+ and v−, we can still have different prediction proba-
bilities for different input instances.
2. Note that we probably have r∗ 6= r˜∗.
4(a) (b) (c) (d)
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Fig. 2: The adversarial robustness of obtained binary classification models evaluated with FGSM, PGD, DeepFool, and
C&W’s attacks: (a)-(d) for LeNet-300-100 and (e)-(h) for LeNet-5. Ten runs from different initializations were performed
and the average results are illustrated for fair comparisons. The y axis of the four subfigures on the left are normalized to
the same numerical scale, and so as the four on the right. It can be seen that penalizing ν2/2 and µ2 perform similarly.
further have simple analytic expressions for the concerned
regularizers as:
Jacobian regularizer := λµ2,
Input-gradient regularizer := λ(1− p(x)y)2ν2,
Curvature regularizer := λp(x)y(1− p(x)y)ν2,
(11)
in which ‖H‖2 calculates the spectral norm (i.e., the matrix
l2 norm) of H , λ > 0 is a hyper-parameter, and µ denotes
‖V ‖F which is apparently a local Lipschitz constant of
g(·) [10]. Third, it holds that (1 − p(x)y)2ν2 ≤ p(x)y(1 −
p(x)y)ν
2 ≤ µ2/2 (i.e., ‖∇‖22 ≤ ‖H‖2 ≤ ‖V ‖2F /2), and thus
we get a chained inequality of the regularizers. Without loss
of generality, we write the regularizers in squared forms in
Eq. (11) for direct comparison.
One might have noticed that ν and p(x)y are also the
only ingredients in two of the regularizers in Eq. (11). In the
remainder of this subsection, we shall discuss and highlight
that: (1) the input-gradient regularization and curvature reg-
ularization both enforce suppression of ν2, which is in prin-
ciple consistent with a cross-Lipschitz regularization [10]; (2)
though the Jacobian regularization focuses on µ2 instead of
ν2, there probably exists an underlying equivalence between
penalizing scaled ν2 and µ2; (3) critical discrepancies still
exist amongst these regularizations, mostly about p(x)y .
Cross-Lipschitz vs. Lipschitz: With clear expressions in
Eq. (7) and (11), we know that the input-gradient regular-
ization and curvature regularization are similar to a cross-
Lipschitz regularization that penalizes λν2/2 [10] 3, while the
Jacobian regularization penalizes λµ2 (with a local Lipschitz
constant µ) and it boils down to weight decay in single-layer
perceptrons and linear classifiers. Although it seems as if
the Jacobian regularization was different from the others, in
light of the Parseval tight frame and Parseval networks [9],
3. Interested readers can refer to Section G for rigorous analyses.
we conjecture nonetheless that there exists an equivalence
between penalizing scaled ν2 (as with the cross-Lipschitz
regularization, input-gradient regularization, and curvature
regularization) and µ2 (as with the Jacobian regularization).
To shed light on this, more discussions are performed as
follows.
First and foremost, it is self-evident that the inequality
ν2/2 ≤ 1
2
‖v+‖22 + |vT+v−|+
1
2
‖v−‖22 ≤ µ2 (12)
holds, thus one might argue that adopting the Jacobian
regularization also implies small ν2 in obtained models as
with the cross-Lipschitz regularization. Second, for single-
layer perceptrons, we can easily verify that the function g(·)
is convex, and thus the Jacobian regularized training loss is
strongly convex w.r.t. V . Considering that the columns of
V can be processed simultaneously by adding/subtracting
a vector whilst the classification decision and cross-entropy
loss won’t change, we have −v+ = v− for the optimal V
and an equivalence is achieved between penalizing λν2/2
and λµ2 through derivation. The result naturally generalizes
to DNNs with locally linear g(·) (i.e., DNNs with general
ReLU activations) of our interest, if only the final layer is to
be optimized. The following proposition makes this formal,
and the proof can be found in Appendix D.
Proposition 3.4. (A derived equivalence). For a single-layer
perceptron or a piecewise linear DNN in which only the final layer
parameterized by Wd is to be optimized, we have the equivalence:
∀λ ≥ 0, argmin
Wd
E(x,y)[L(x, y;V ) + λν2/2] =
argmin
Wd
E(x,y)[L(x, y;V ) + λµ2].
(13)
In addition to the above results, we further show that the
two regularizations can lead to the same gradient flow in
certain scenarios. One example in which this can be demon-
strated is when the first feature is uncorrelated with the label
5y and the other (n−1) features are distributed normally with
the mean value being propotional to y (i.e., they are weakly
correlated with the label) [30]. We let v+ ← [0, a, . . . , a] and
v− ← [0,−a, . . . ,−a] approach the Bayes error rate. Under
such circumstance, the two regularizations initialized from
the Bayes classifier share the same gradient flow for their V
matrices, provided 2× smaller penalty to ν2 than to µ2 as in
Eq. (13) .
To test whether the revealed equivalence generalizes to
practical scenarios, we conducted an experiment on distin-
guishing the digit “7” from “1” using MNIST images. Our
experimental settings and many more details are carefully
introduced in Appendix F. As suggested [6], [12], we first
trained baseline models from scratch without any explicit
regularization, then fine-tuned the models using different
regularization strategies and evaluated the obtained adver-
sarial robustness to FGSM [2], PGD [3], DeepFool [20], and
the C&W’s attack [18]. We trained MLPs and convolutional
networks with ReLU nonlinearity following the LeNet-300-
100 and LeNet-5 architectures in prior work [31]. Figure 2
compares the performance of regularizations incorporating
λν2/2 and λµ2. With varying λ, it can be seen that the
regularized models show similar robustness in almost all
test cases. Similar results on CIFAR-10 with ResNets and
VGG-like networks can be found in Appendix F.
Fig. 3: Different regularizers focus on samples with different
prediction confidence.
“Confidence” in regularizations: Apart from suppress-
ing the local (cross-)Lipschitz constants, the input-gradient
regularizer and curvature regularizer both involve the pre-
diction probability p(x)y in Eq. (11), with different objectives
though. By incorporating (1− p(x)y)(1− p(x)y), the input-
gradient regularization encourages model predictions with
high confidence. If ν2 is fixed, then the p(x)y-related term in
the input-gradient regularizer acts as an additional predic-
tion loss during training. It has larger penalties and slopes
(in absolute value) for the training instances with relatively
smaller p(x)y , i.e., lower confidence. Similarly, we know that
the curvature regularization involves p(x)y(1 − p(x)y) and
advocates large p(x)y as well. However, as depicted in the
green curve in Figure 3, the function exhibits larger absolute
value of slope at predictions with higher confidence, which
is different from p(x)y(1 − p(x)y) but consistent with the
preference of ‖r∗‖2 as shown in Figure 1 right. As for
the cross-Lipschitz regularizer and Jacobian regularizer, no
p(x)y-related term is explicitly involved whatsoever. 4
4. See Eq. (11), the “regularizer” means the regularization term itself
in this paper. Note that the cross-entropy term involves the prediction
probability p(x)y of course.
Although it is unclear which of the tactics would be the
most suitable one in practice, one might be aware that differ-
ent choices perform dis-similarly, otherwise we should have
obtained functional equivalence for all these contestants. In
order to figure out the best one in practice, we compared the
achieved robustness via input-gradient regularization and
curvature regularization empirically with our results using
the cross-Lipschitz regularization and Jacobian regulariza-
tion. As shown in Figure 4, the lately developed curvature
regularization surpasses all its competitors with reasonably
large λ values, showing the superiority of its specific tactic
of handling confident predictions. Notice that we retain the
same numerical ranges of axes in Figure 4 as in Figure 2, but
some newly drawn curves (for curvature regularization) in
Figure 4 may be too promising to stick in the plot.
4 MULTI-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
This section focuses on multi-class classification tasks. The
notations are mostly the same as those in the binary classifi-
cation. Suppose there are K possible labels for an instance,
i.e., y ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1} and K ≥ 2, then for the discussed
general ReLU networks, we have nd = K . Similarly, there
exists a polytopeQ(x) to which the input instance x belongs
and on which the network g(·) is linear, i.e.
g(x′)|x′∈Q(x) = V Tx′, (14)
in which V = [v0, . . . ,vK−1] is a matrix with its j-th
column vj := W1D1(x) . . .Wd−1Dd−1(x)wj . For the prop-
erties of DNNs that are considered in the regularization
strategies, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. (Simplified expressions for J , ∇, and H in
multi-class classification). Given an input instance paired with
the one-hot representation of its label (x,y), we have for J , ∇,
and H :
J = V,
∇ = V (p(x)− y),
H = V
(
diag(p(x))− p(x)T p(x)
)
V T
=
∑
i<j p(x)ip(x)j(vi − vj)(vi − vj)T .
(15)
The above expressions for ∇ and H seem more complex
and different from those given in Lemma 3.2. In particular,
the local cross-Lipschitz constant seems absent in ‖∇‖2 (for
the input-gradient regularizer). Furthermore, on account of
the difficulty of decomposing the Hessian matrixH ∈ Rn×n,
one might not have an analytic expression for its spectral
norm and ‖r∗‖2, in which the concerned adversarial pertur-
bation r∗ ∈ Rn is defined similarly as in binary classification
in Section 3.1, involving a threshold value of log(K) rather
than log(2). To give insights as in the binary classification
scenarios, we first derive bounds for the magnitude of the
adversarial perturbation r∗.
Proposition 4.1. (Lower bounds of ‖r∗‖2 in multi-class
classification). For the multi-class classifier with a locally linear
g(·) and a correctly classified instance x, we have the bounds
‖r∗‖2 ≥ 4‖V ‖F
K(K − 1)p(x)yν2
×
(√
1 +
K(K − 1)p(x)yν2ξ
4(1− p(x)y)‖V ‖2F
− 1
)
,
(16)
6(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 4: The robustness of all obtained binary classification models evaluated with FGSM, PGD, DeepFool, and the C&W’s
attacks: (a)-(d) for LeNet-300-100 and (e)-(h) for LeNet-5. Ten runs from different initializations were performed and the
average results are reported. The y axis of the four subfigures on the left are normalized to the same numerical scale, and
so as the four on the right. It can be seen that the curvature regularization shows the most promising performance.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 5: The robustness of obtained multi-class classification models evaluated with FGSM, PGD, DeepFool, and the C&W’s
attacks: (a)-(d) for LeNet-300-100 and (e)-(h) for LeNet-5. Ten runs from different initializations were performed and the
average results over the multiple runs are reported. The curvature regularization is not compared as approximations seem
inevitable in its multi-class implementation.
and
‖r∗‖2 ≥ 1
p(x)y ‖V ‖F
(√
1 +
p(x)yξ
(1− p(x)y) − 1
)
. (17)
Considering that the value of ξ = log(K)− log(p(x)y) is
determinate w.r.t. the prediction probability p(x)y , we can
conclude from Eq. (17) that the essential ingredients of such
a lower bound are p(x)y and ‖V ‖F (i.e., the Frobenius norm
of an n ×K matrix V ). Likewise, we can easily verify that
‖V ‖F is a local Lipschitz constant of g(·). Somewhat unsur-
prisingly, a property considered in the cross-Lipschitz regu-
larization defined as ν2 :=
∑ ‖vi−vj‖22/K2 [10] is involved
in the other derived lower bound as given in Eq. (16). The
results show that the local (cross-)Lipschitz constants and
prediction probability are possibly still the essential ingredi-
ents of ‖r∗‖2. Apart from Proposition 4.1, we further know
that the chained inequality ‖∇‖2/2 ≤ ‖H‖2 ≤ ‖V ‖F /2
holds by derivations from Lemma 4.1. More discussions
similar to those made for binary classification in Section 3.2
will be given in Appendix E (right after the proof).
As in binary classification, we aim to study possible
connections between regularizations penalizing a squared
7local Lipschitz constant µ2 := ‖V ‖2F and ν2. Experimental
results are given to show a vague equivalence. The same
MLP and convolutional architectures were adopted. Similar
to the binary classification experiments, we trained multiple
baseline models for each considered architecture and fine-
tuned them using different regularizations. The same train-
ing and test policies were also kept. We report the average
results of obtained model robustness to FGSM, PGD, Deep-
fool, and the C&W’s attack in Figure 5. It can be seen that the
Jacobian regularization and cross-Lipschitz regularization
still perform similarly across all tested λ values, except for
the ones being too large to keep the models numerically
stable. NaN was produced in Jacobian regularized LeNet-5
if λ was further enlarged.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper aims at exploring and analyzing possible con-
nections between recent network-property-based regular-
izations for improving the adversarial robustness of DNNs.
While the empirical effectiveness of appropriate regulariza-
tions has been demonstrated in prior arts [6], [10], [11], [12],
there still lacks systematic understanding of their intrinsic
functionality and connections. We made some comparative
analyses among these regularizations and our achievements
include:
• We have analyzed regularizations on DNNs with ReLU
activations from a theoretical perspective.
• We have presented analytic expressions for the l2 and
l∞ magnitudes of some approximately-optimal adver-
sarial perturbations, and we have shown that the local
cross-Lipschitz constants and prediction probability are
their essential ingredients in binary classification.
• We have demonstrated that, the regularizations suggest
either small Lipschitz constants or small cross-Lipschitz
constants, and regularizing them can be equivalent. Yet,
critical discrepancies still exist between specific regular-
izations, mostly in handling the prediction probability.
• We have verified that curvature regularization [6] con-
cerned in a very recent paper shows the most promising
performance, and we have extended some of our analy-
ses to multi-class classification and verified our findings
with experiments.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.2
Proof. According to the definition, it is self-evident that J =
V . As for the input-gradient, we have
∇xL(x, y) = −V (y − p(x))
= −y(1− p(x)y)(v+ − v−)T ,
(18)
according to the chain rule, in which y ∈ {±1} and y is its
one-hot vector representation. Similarly, the Hessian matrix
of L(·, ·) w.r.t. x is
H = ∇x (V (p(x)− y))
= V (∇x (p(x)− y)))T
= V (diag(p(x)− p(x)p(x)T )V T
= p(x)+p(x)−(v+ − v−)(v+ − v−)T .
(19)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1
Proof. From the expression ofH shown in Eq. (19), we know
that H is a rank-1 positive semi-definite matrix and its
only eigenvalue becomes the maximal eigenvalue (i.e, the
spectral norm). Since the instance is correctly classified, we
have p(x)y > 0.5 and ‖v+−v−‖2 6= 0 hold. Suppose that x
and v+ − v− have finite magnitude, then we further know
p(x)y 6= 1.0. From
H∇ = p(x)y(1− p(x)y) ‖v+ − v−‖22∇,
we know that ∇ should be an eigenvector corresponding to
p(x)y(1 − p(x)y) ‖v+ − v−‖22 > 0 as the eigenvalue of H .
Hence we have u = ± ∇‖∇‖2 and further
|∇Tu| = ‖∇‖2 .
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In consequence, the upper bound and low bound in Lemma
3.1 are in fact the same at this point, and it follows that
‖r∗‖2 =
‖∇‖2
‖H‖2
(√
1 +
2‖H‖2ξ
‖∇‖22
− 1
)
=
(1− p(x)y) ‖v+ − v−‖2
p(x)y(1− p(x)y) ‖v+ − v−‖22
√√√√1 + 2p(x)y(1− p(x)y) ‖v+ − v−‖22 ξ
(1− p(x)y)2 ‖v+ − v−‖22
− 1

=
1
p(x)y‖v+ − v−‖2(√
1 +
2p(x)yξ
1− p(x)y − 1
)
.
(20)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2 AND 3.3
We first provide our proof of Proposition 3.2 which shows
an analytic expression for ‖rˆ∗‖∞ as below.
Proof. According to the definition, we have:
‖r˜∗‖∞ := min ‖r‖∞ s.t. L(x, y) +∇T r+ rTHr/2 ≥ β.
(21)
By substituting H with its expression given in Lemma
3.2, the above constraint can be written as
−ξ +∇T r+ p(x)y
2 (1− p(x)y)
(
∇T r
)2 ≥ 0. (22)
Now that∇T r is a scalar, we can consider (22) as a quadratic
inequality and equivalently we have
∇T r ≥1− p(x)y
p(x)
(√
1 +
2p(x)yξ
1− p(x)y − 1
)
or
∇T r ≤− 1− p(x)y
p(x)
(√
1 +
2p(x)yξ
1− p(x)y + 1
)
.
2Since it holds that ‖r‖∞ ≥ ∇T r‖∇‖1 ≥ −‖r‖∞ for any r ∈ Rn
and the equalities should be attained at r = ‖r‖∞sign(∇)
and r = −‖r‖∞sign(∇) respectively, we have
‖r˜∗‖∞ = 1− p(x)y
p(x)‖∇‖1
(√
1 +
2p(x)yξ
1− p(x)y − 1
)
=
1
p(x)‖v+ − v−‖1
(√
1 +
2p(x)yξ
1− p(x)y − 1
)
.
(23)
Then it is the proof of Proposition 3.3.
Proof. We aim at analyzing η∗ := max‖r‖∞≤ L(x, y) +
∇T r + rTHr/2. According to the Ho¨lder’s inequality, we
have for all r ∈ Rn satisfying ‖r‖∞ ≤ , it holds that
∇T r+ rTHr/2 =∇T r+ p(x)y
2 (1− p(x)y)
(
∇T r
)2
≤‖r‖∞‖∇‖1 + p(x)y
2 (1− p(x)y) (‖r‖∞‖∇‖1)
2
=‖∇‖1 + p(x)y
2 (1− p(x)y) (‖∇‖1)
2
.
(24)
By further substituting the vector ∇ with the expression
given in Lemma 3.2, we have
∇T r+ rTHr/2 ≤ (1− p(x)y)‖v+ − v−‖
+
1
2
2p(x)y(1− p(x)y)‖v+ − v−‖2
(25)
to complete our proof, and we know that the equality should
be attained at r =  · sign(∇).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.4
Proof. Let us denote by L′(·) and L′′(·) the loss functions
for training regularized by the Jacobian and cross-Lipschitz
strategies, respectively. That is, L′(V ) = −E[log p(x;V )y] +
λ′µ2 and L′′(V ) = −E[log p(x;V )y] + λ′′ν2, in which
E[·] calculates the sample mean rather than the population
mean. It is easy to verify that L′(V ) is strongly convex w.r.t.
V for single layer perceptrons and piecewise linear DNNs in
which only the final layer is to be optimized, thus we have
a unique optimal solution to minV L′(V ). Let us denote the
optimal solution as V ′ = [v′+,v
′
−].
For binary classification in which y ∈ {+1,−1}, it holds
for any matrix V = [v+,v−] that,
− E[log p(x;V )y]
=− E
[
1 + y
2
log p(x;V )+1 +
1− y
2
log p(x;V )−1
]
=− E
[
1 + y
2
log p(x;V )+1 +
1− y
2
log(1− p(x;V )+1)
]
.
(26)
By definition of the cross-entropy function, we have
p(x;V )+1 =
exp(〈v+,x〉)
exp(〈v+,x〉) + exp(〈v−,x〉)
=
exp(〈v+ − v−,x〉)
exp(〈v+ − v−,x〉) + 1 ,
(27)
thus further we can write −E[log p(x;V )y] = h(v+ − v−),
in which h(·) : Rn → R can also easily be verified as a
convex function. We rewrite the loss function of a Jacobian-
regularized training as
L′(V ) = h(v+ − v−) + 1
2
λ′ν22 +
1
2
λ′‖v+ + v−‖22, (28)
considering 2µ2 = ν22 + ‖v+ + v−‖22. Apparently, the first
two terms on the right hand side of the above equation
should remain unchanged if the vector v+ − v− does. Let
us introduce Vˆ ′ = [vˆ′+, vˆ
′
−], in which vˆ
′
+ =
v+−v−
2 and
vˆ′− = −vˆ′+. Now we have vˆ′+ − vˆ′− = v′+ − v′− and
L′(Vˆ ′)− L′(V ′) = 1
2
λ′‖vˆ′+ + vˆ′−‖22 −
1
2
λ′‖v′+ + v′−‖22
≤ −1
2
λ′‖v′+ + v′−‖22 ≤ 0.
(29)
Recall that V ′ is the optimal solution to minV L′(V ), we also
have 0 ≤ L′(Vˆ ′)−L′(V ′). Therefore, we have v′+ +v′− = 0
holds in order to avoid contradictions. The obtained equa-
tion eliminates the third term in Eq. (28). Thus we know, for
λ′′ = λ′/2, it holds that
L′(V ′) = L′′(V ′). (30)
We now proceed similarly for an optimal solution to the
problem minV L′′(V ). By writing L′′(V ) = h(v+ − v−) +
λ′′ν2 = l(v++v−), we can verify that the newly introduced
function l(·) : Rn → R is strongly convex as well. Let us
denote the optimal solution to minw l(w) as w′′, then by
further introducing v′′+ = w
′′/2 and v′′− = −vˆ′′+, we can
verify that
L′(V ′′) = L′′(V ′′). (31)
According to Eq. (30)-(31) and the definitions of the optimal
solutions V ′ and V ′′, we now have
L′(V ′) (30)= L′′(V ′)def.≥ L′′(V ′′) (31)= L′(V ′′)def.≥ L′(V ′), (32)
which leads to L′′(V ) = L′′(V ) for V being equal to V ′ or
V ′′ and we have proved the proposition.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1 AND MORE
Proof. For a K-class classification task with y ∈ {0, . . . ,K −
1} and the cross-entropy loss chosen, we still have from
Lemma 3.1 that
‖∇‖2
‖H‖2
(√
1 +
2‖H‖2ξ
‖∇‖22
− 1
)
≤ ‖r∗‖2 ≤
|∇Tu|
‖H‖2
(√
1 +
2‖H‖2ξ
|∇Tu|2 − 1
)
,
(33)
in which ξ := log(K)−L(x, y). In order to derive insightful
bounds of ‖r∗‖2 with less entangled variables, we first
analyze the involved networks properties ‖∇‖2 and ‖H‖2
and then take advantage of the monotonicity of the lower
bound given above.
From the expressions summarized in Lemma 4.1 we
know it holds that
‖∇‖2 ≤ 2(1− p(x)y) ‖V ‖2 ≤ 2(1− p(x)y) ‖V ‖F , (34)
3and
‖H‖2 ≤
∑
i<j
p(x)ip(x)j‖vi − vj‖22. (35)
By utilizing two simple inequalities ‖vi−vj‖22 ≤ 2(‖vi‖22 +
‖vj‖22),∀i, j, and p(x)i(1 − p(x)i) ≤ p(x)y(1 − p(x)y),∀i,
we further get to know that
‖H‖2 ≤
∑
i 6=j
p(x)ip(x)j
(‖vi‖22 + ‖vj‖22)
≤ 2p(x)y (1− p(x)y) ‖V ‖2F .
(36)
The lower bound in Eq. (33) in terms of ‖H‖2 or ‖∇‖2 is
monotonically decreasing, thus we have
‖r∗‖2 ≥ 2(1− p(x)y) ‖V ‖F
2p(x)y (1− p(x)y) ‖V ‖2F
√√√√1 + 4p(x)y (1− p(x)y) ‖V ‖2F ξ
4(1− p(x)y)2 ‖V ‖2F
− 1

≥ 1
p(x)y ‖V ‖F(√
1 +
p(x)yξ
(1− p(x)y) − 1
)
.
(37)
Now that we have derived the second bound in the proposi-
tion, we can turn to deriving the first one. Again, according
to the monotonicity of the bound in Eq. (33), we get to know
‖r∗‖2 ≥ 2(1− p(x)y)‖V ‖F∑
i<j p(x)ip(x)j ‖vi − vj‖22
√√√√1 + 2∑i<j p(x)ip(x)j ‖vi − vj‖22 ξ
4(1− p(x)y)2‖V ‖2F
− 1

≥ 4‖V ‖F
K(K − 1)p(x)yν2(√
1 +
K(K − 1)p(x)yν2ξ
4(1− p(x)y)‖V ‖2F
− 1
)
,
(38)
in which ν :=
∑ ‖vi − vj‖22/K2 is first introduced in
the cross-Lipschitz regularization [1] and the evident in-
equality p(x)ip(x)j ≤ p(x)y(1 − p(x)y),∀i, is utilized. In
general multi-class classification scenarios, it is challenging
to compare K(K − 1)ν2/4 with ‖V ‖2F directly, hence we
are uncertain which of the derived lower bounds would be
tighter.
In addition to the above proof, we will discuss as fol-
lows more about the adversarial robustness in multi-class
classification scenarios and possible connections between
regularizations at this point. First of all, we try to analyze
worst-case perturbations for l∞ norm-based attacks. We
care about the lower bound of ‖r˜∗‖∞, in which r˜∗ ∈ Rn
is defined similarly as in binary classification except for a
different value of threshold. We notice that the inequality
−ξ + ‖∇‖1‖r˜∗‖∞ + n‖H‖1‖r˜
∗‖2∞
2
≥
−ξ +∇T r∗ + (r
∗)T Hr∗
2
≥ 0,
(39)
holds, on account of Ho¨lder’s inequality and (r∗)T Hr∗ ≤
n‖H‖1‖r˜∗‖2∞. Therefore, we can get
‖r˜∗‖∞ ≥ 2ξ√‖∇‖21 + 2n‖H‖1ξ + ‖∇‖1 . (40)
According to the definition of induced matrix norms, we
additionally have ‖∇‖1 ≤ 2(1 − p(x)y)‖V ‖1 and ‖H‖1 ≤
2p(x)y(1 − p(x)y)‖V ‖1‖V ‖∞ to achieve a lower bound of
‖r˜∗‖∞ without the Hessian and the input-gradient getting
involved. Apparently, the prediction probability and matrix
norms of V are still essential ingredients of the DNN robust-
ness under such circumstance, as we have presented in the
multi-class l2 case.
Cross-Lipschitz and Lipschitz: Even though it is difficult
to compare K(K − 1)ν2/4 with ‖V ‖2F directly, we know
from Proposition 4.1 that penalizing the two quantities
both contribute to improving the DNN robustness, and in
fact they have already been adopted in the cross-Lipschitz
and Jacobian regularizations, respectively. We now discuss
about their connections with other network properties and
regularizations. As have been introduced in the main body
of our paper, we have that the chained inequality ‖∇‖22/2 ≤
‖H‖2 ≤ ‖V ‖2F /2 holds, which is obtained in virtue of:
‖H‖2 ≤ 2p(x)y(1− p(x)y) ‖V ‖2F ≤
1
2
‖V ‖2F (41)
and
‖H‖2 =‖
∑
p(x)i(vi − v¯)(vi − v¯)T ‖2
≥p(x)y ‖vy − v¯‖22 ≥ p(x)y‖∇‖22
≥1
2
‖∇‖22,
(42)
in which v¯ := V p(x). Similarly, we can as well derive a
chained inequality for the quantity adopted in the cross-
Lipschitz regularization (and the first bound in Proposition
4.1) as ‖∇‖22/2 ≤ ‖H‖2 ≤ K(K − 1)ν2/8, by taking
advantage of Eq. (42) and:
‖H‖2 ≤
∑
i<j
p(x)ip(x)j ‖vi − vj‖22
≤1
2
K(K − 1)p(x)y(1− p(x)y)ν2
≤1
8
K(K − 1)ν2.
(43)
APPENDIX F
SETTINGS AND CIFAR-10 RESULTS
In this section, we first introduce our experimental settings
on MNIST, involving the training and test policies, DNN
architectures, evaluation metrics, etc., and then provide
results on CIFAR-10.
Experimental Settings: The official training/test split of
MNIST [2] is utilized. As briefly introduced, we train/test
with an MLP codenamed “LeNet-300-100” and a convolu-
tional neural network codenamed “LeNet-5” on MNIST. The
former is comprised of two parameterized fully-connected
layers, and the latter contains two convolutional layers,
two max-pooling layers and two fully-connected layers.
We trained 10 models each from different initializations
for them as references, and fine-tuned the obtained models
with different regularizations discussed in this paper to
4((a)) ((b)) ((c)) ((d))
((e)) ((f)) ((g)) ((h))
((i)) ((j)) ((k)) ((l))
Fig. 6: The robustness of all obtained binary classification models evaluated with FGSM, PGD, DeepFool and the C&W’s
attacks on CIFAR-10: (a)-(d) for the four-layer convolutional network with batch normalizations, (e)-(h) for the VGG-like
network, and (i)-(l) for ResNet. Ten runs from different initializations are performed and the average results are reported
for fair comparisons.
evaluate their performance under adversarial attacks. All
experiments were performed on a single NVIDIA Titan X
GPU, and official implementations from the authors of the
regularizations were adopted. TensorFlow [3] and Clever-
Hans [4] were used.
We directly applied the training policies suggested in the
Caffe model zoo [5] for LeNet-300-100 and LeNet-5, and we
trained models on MNIST with a common batch size of 64
for 50,000 iterations such that they all definitely reached the
plateau. For the binary LeNet-300-100 and LeNet-5 models,
we achieved prediction accuracies of 99.57 ± 0.05% and
99.86 ± 0.03%, respectively. To evaluate the adversarial
robustness of DNN models, we chose four prevalent attacks,
i.e., FGSM [6], PGD [7], DeepFool [8], and the C&W’s at-
tack [9], two of which are l∞ norm-based and the other two
are l2 norm-based. With  = 0.1, the prediction accuracies of
the reference models degraded significantly (to 34.91± 0.81
and 86.32±4.86%) on FGSM examples and (to 7.84±0.50%
and 35.10± 1.97%) on PGD adversarial examples. In multi-
class scenarios, we similarly had reference models with
high prediction accuracies (98.08± 0.08% and 99.10± 0.05
for LeNet-300-100 and LeNet-5 respectively) on the benign
test set, yet a deteriorating effect can be observed on the
adversarial examples.
For training on MNIST, we regularized with various λ
values chosen from {10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 1.6}.
Such a set should cover many suggested values for setting
this hyper-parameter in the literature, and we also noticed in
the experiments that further enlarging the value of λ would
probably cause numerical instability during training and
generated NaN in the network gradients. In fact, with a λ as
large as 1.6 on the tested dataset, most of the terms aimed
to be penalized have become extremely small (typically with
an order of magnitude ≤ 10) on the training instances, thus
more attention should be paid to their numerical ranges and
stability. Curvature regularization, however, was stable over
the range of our tested λ, and we also observed that its
robustness to the C&W’s attack increased to nearly 2.0 (i.e.,
the required magnitude of perturbations to successfully fool
the model was ∼2.0 in average) with λ = 6.4.
Experimental results on CIFAR-10: As introduced, we
also performed experiments on CIFAR-10, with some much
deeper networks than those tested on MNIST. To be con-
crete, we chose a four-layer convolutional network similar
to LeNet-5 but with batch normalization [10] incorporated, a
VGG-like network [11] (incorporating twelve convolutional
layers and two fully-connected layers) and a ResNet [12] (in-
corporating 31 convolutional layers, a single fully-connected
layers and no batch normalization). Again, we trained 10
models each from different initializations for them as ref-
erences, and fine-tuned the obtained models with different
regularizations. We trained them for 100,000 iterations to
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Fig. 7: The robustness of obtained multi-class classification models evaluated with FGSM, PGD, DeepFool, and the C&W’s
attacks: (a)-(d) for the four-layer convolutional network incorporating batch normalizations and (e)-(h) for the VGG-like
DNN. The curvature regularization was not compared as approximations seem inevitable in its multi-class implementation.
NaN is triggered with λ = 0.1 on Jacobian and cross-Lipschitz regularized VGG-like models. ResNets are not evaluated
due to the limlited computational resources.
ensure convergence, and we decayed the learning rate by
10-fold at iterations 60,000, and 80,000.
We report the robustness of regularized models to ad-
versarial attacks in Figure 6. The hyper-parameter  for l∞
attacks was set to be 0.05, and λ was chosen to be smaller
(than the values on MNIST) to guarantee a stable training
process, from {10−6, 10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 0.1}. We ob-
served that even with the hyper-parameter as small as 0.1,
it is possible to produce NaN during the training of some
multi-class models on CIFAR-10, but for the binary clas-
sification models, further increasing λ might lead to even
stronger adversarial robustness. Nevertheless, performing
a grid search of the best λ for each model is beyond the
scope of this paper, so we might not achieve the optimal
performance of the discussed methods in Figure 6. Multi-
class results are provided in Figure 7.
APPENDIX G
THE LOGISTIC LOSS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
It is mentioned that our theoretical results in binary classifi-
cation with cross-entropy loss generalize to the case trained
with logistic loss, which calculates log(1 + exp(−yvTx))
for an instance x with label y ∈ {±1}, in which v :=
W1D1(x) . . .Wd−1Dd−1(x)wd is an n-dimensional vector.
Now let us discuss more about it. Equivalently, we rewrite
the logistic loss as − log(p(x)y), in which p(x)− = 1/(1 +
exp(vTx)) and p(x)+ = 1 − p(x)−, hence if V = [v,0]
we know by simple derivations that v plays the same role
(in training with the logistic loss) as the vector v+ − v−
(in training with the cross-entropy loss). That being said,
what follows is coincident with those presented in the paper.
Future work should include studies on other loss functions.
Just as also mentioned in the main body of our paper,
we consider the local (cross-)Lipschitz constants and the
prediction probability p(x)y separately in regularizers for
simplicity reasons, and we have our conclusions hold even
if their mutual influence is rigorously analyzed. Regarding
the mutual influence in binary classification, it is mostly on
account of ν = ‖v+ − v−‖2. Since the prediction probabili-
ties p(x)+ and p(x)− can be written as functions w.r.t. ν and
γ := |wˇTx|, in which wˇ := (v+ − v−)/ν is a normalized
vector, we cast the problem as discussing about the mono-
tonicity of ‖r∗‖2 in terms of ν with care. We emphasize that
it is actually a bit complicated, as the monotonicity highly
depend on the value of γ, and we accomplish the task by
calculating the derivative of regularizers including ‖∇‖22
and ‖H‖2 w.r.t. ν, respectively. Specifically, we have
∂‖∇‖22
∂ν
=
2ν (1− (γν − 1) exp (γν))
(1 + exp(γν))3
(44)
and
∂‖H‖2
∂ν
=
ν (2 + γν − (γν − 2) exp (γν)) exp (γν)
(1 + exp(γν))3
. (45)
By solving ∂‖∇‖22/∂ν = 0 and ∂‖H‖2/∂ν = 0, we can get
the critical points as 1.28/γ and 2.40/γ. That being said,
if νγ ≤ 1.28 and νγ ≤ 2.40 are fulfilled, then penalizing
scaled ‖∇‖22 and ‖H‖2 indicate a smaller local Lipschitz
constant ν, respectively. We evaluate νγ with models trained
on MNIST and CIFAR-10, and we find that the conditions
are satisfied for almost all training instances. More specif-
ically, the average value of νγ on the LeNet-300-100 refer-
ences is only roughly 0.001 and the largest value is roughly
1.570. After training with regularizations, the values of both
νγ and ν become orders of magnitude smaller, making the
results rigorously hold for all instances. It can be interesting
to evaluate whether it is the gap between 1.28 and 2.40 that
affects the regularization performance in future works. Note
that similar analyses can be made to the magnitude of r∗,
6but we feel the result in that case makes less sense since the
definition of r∗ is subject to approximations.
APPENDIX H
MULTI-CLASS REGULARIZATIONS
We did not test the curvature regularization in multi-class
scenarios, mostly because some approximations seem in-
evitable. With approximations, it is relatively difficult to tell
whether there will be functional equivalence or not from
experimental results. As have been mentioned, through the
lens of our study, it is possible to develop some more
regularization methods by consolidating the current ones
and their essential ingredients. We would like to study it
more carefully in future work and compare with the current
multi-class curvature approximators if possible.
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